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Abstract: We extend the Burdett and Coles (2003) search model with wage-tenure contracts to 
two types of workers and firms and derive the equilibrium earnings distributions for both types 
of workers, by means of which we succeed in predicting many stylized facts found in empirics. 
For example, we find that at the same wage level, majority workers almost always experience a 
faster wage increase than the minority workers; minority workers have a higher unemployment 
rate; discriminating firms make lower profit than non-discriminating firms and offers to minority 
workers by non-discriminating firms are consistently superior to those provided by 
discriminating firms etc. Besides, we find a similar result to the classical discrimination theory 
that the average wage of the majority workers, though higher in most cases, can be smaller than 
their counterpart’s wage when the fraction of discriminating firms is small and the degree of 
recruiting discrimination and disutility are mild. We also show that in a special case of CRRA 
utility function with the coefficient of relative risk aversion approaching infinity, our model 
degenerates to Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). 
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1. Introduction 
The traditional discrimination literature--the taste-based theory of discrimination (Becker, 1971; Borjas 
and Bronars, 1989) and statistical discrimination (Aigner and Cain, 1977) are often subject to criticism on 
the grounds that prejudice cannot possibly be sustained in the long run due to the assumption of a 
competitive market.
2
 Discrimination in the search framework, on the other hand, does not share this 
problem. For example, Black (1995) studies discrimination in an equilibrium search model where a cost is 
incorporated in the job search process and discriminating firms are assumed to hire only majority workers. 
He shows that the wage minority workers receive is less than the wage of their counterparts in the 
presence of prejudice; and it increases with the proportion of the minority workers in the labor market. 
However, his model cannot predict wage dispersion among equally productive workers. To overcome this 
weakness, Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) construct a discrimination framework based on Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998) in which on-the-job search implies a non-degenerate wage distribution among identical 
workers. Nonetheless, it also inherits some defects of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), i.e., inefficient 
equilibrium results and the unrealistic constant wage assumption (noted in Burdett and Coles (2003) and 
Stevens (2004)). So, in order to generate wage dispersion among similar workers and derive a more 
realistic model, we use the Burdett and Coles (2003)’s general equilibrium search model with wage-
tenure contracts as the framework to explore the implications of discrimination. We are, then, able to 
identify differences in the patterns of wage dynamics for both types of workers resulting from 
discrimination, which to the best of our knowledge, has not been explored before.  
In what follows, we will outline the discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts and some 
equilibrium results. To discuss the effect of discrimination on labor market outcomes, we introduce two 
types of workers and firms: (1) majority workers   and minority workers ; (2) discriminating firms   
and non-discriminating firms .3 Workers are assumed to be identical except for their appearance. Firms 
who experience a disutility from hiring minority workers recruit them at a slower rate. So, for type   
workers firms are homogenous while for type   workers they are heterogeneous. In this paper, 
discrimination is associated with 3 parameters:  the fraction of  -firms, the degree of recruiting 
discrimination and the disutility taste  -firms have when hiring type   workers, all of which are assumed 
to be exogenously determined.
4
  
Our model belongs to a class of random search models.
5
 Firms post tenure-based contracts for both types 
of workers, recruit workers and pay wages specified in the contracts. Workers, both unemployed and 
employed search for jobs randomly, accept the offers which arrive at an exogenous rate if and only if the 
expected lifetime value from the new offer is higher than the current one. Firms cannot fire workers or 
counter-offer workers’ outside offers.  
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See Cain (1986) for a good review.  
3
In this paper, majority and minority workers are only representations of different groups of people, say male and 
female (gender), or white and black (race). They do not necessarily indicate group size.  
4
As shown in the equilibrium, a firm, no matter the discriminating firm or non-discriminating firm, will design 
different optimal wage contracts for type   and   workers. However, this plausibly “discriminating” result is not 
what we mean by discrimination in this paper. Instead, we focus on the effect of discriminating recruitment and 
distaste some firms have on the equilibrium outcomes of the labor market.   
5
Shi (2009) build a directed search model for wage-tenure contracts. However, the incorporation of     discrimination 
in the directed search model with wage-tenure contracts is too complicated to derive a tractable equilibrium solution. 
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We show that in equilibrium the optimal contract for   provided by  -firms are uniformly better than that 
provided by  -firms. Though, by offering a high tenure-wage  -firms extract a lower profit from each 
type   worker, they can hire far more   workers who are willing to stay for a longer period so that the 
total profit   workers have created in  -firms exceeds that in  -firms. In addition, since both firms make 
the same profit from type   workers, the total profit is also higher in  -firms than  -firms. This is a 
general finding encountered in the discrimination literature (see, for example, Becker, 1971; Black, 1995).   
Another finding is that the range of discriminating wages is positively related to the fraction of  -firms 
and inversely related to the degree of recruiting discrimination. Specifically, the fewer  -firms are there 
in the labor market, the lower the upper bound of discriminating wages would be. Similarly, the more 
severe the recruiting discrimination, the lower the upper bound would be. Implications as to the lower 
bound of the discriminating wages are simply reversed. We also find that at the steady state, the lowest 
wage  -workers are willing to accept is smaller than the lower bound of  ’s wages only because  -
workers can expect a faster wage increase and a larger probability of getting a new offer than their 
counterparts. However, both are smaller than the unemployment insurance. 
The sign of the mean wage gap between type   and   workers is uncertain. If  -firms don’t hire   
workers at all, it has been proved that on average   earn more than  . However, in a general case, 
minority workers may have a higher average wage than the majority workers when only a few 
discriminating firms with weak distaste and recruiting discrimination are there in the labor 
market.6 But as shown in the numerical exercises, the odd is quite small. Also found in the numerical 
section is that in almost all cases,  ’s wage increases faster than  ’s, a result that can only be obtained in 
our discrimination model where the wage is not constant but increases with tenures.   
Finally, we point out that our model is a generalization of Bowlus and Eckstein (2002).
7
 In a special case 
of CRRA utility function with the coefficient approaching zero, our model degenerates to Bowlus and 
Eckstein (2002) and reaches the same equilibrium results. In addition, a sticky floor effect that the wage 
differential decreases along the wage distribution is found in this case.   
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we construct a discrimination model in the 
search framework with wage-tenure contracts and derive an equilibrium which not only shows the 
difference in wage distributions but also in wage dynamics. More importantly, our model succeeds in 
predicting some stylized facts in the labor market, such as a higher unemployment rate of the minority 
workers; that Whites enjoy faster wage increase along tenures compared to Blacks; that male workers are 
associated with a wider wage range than female workers; that in most cases, the discriminated group has a 
lower average wage; and that a sticky floor effect is mainly documented in some Asian countries; etc. 
The next section sets up the model and discusses workers’ and firms’ optimal decisions. Section 3 
characterizes the equilibrium solutions and section 4 shows the equilibrium properties. In section 5, we 
                                                          
6
A similar result is found in Becker(1971) who shows that in a neoclassical framework, equally productive workers, 
though discriminated by employers in the labor market, may not be paid less if there is only a small fraction of 
employers with prejudice. Aigner and Cain (1977) also find in one special case that discriminated workers earn 
more on average.   
7
Strictly speaking, our model is a generalization of the simplified version of Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) because in 
their model productivity and birth/death rate vary between the two types of workers and offer arrival rates for the 
employed and the unemployed are also different.  
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explore the implications using a special case of utility function, the CRRA utility function. When the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion approaches infinity, the optimal wage-tenure contracts degenerate to a 
constant wage and our discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts degenerate to a variant of 
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). Further, to facilitate comparisons of the average wages and their dynamics, 
we carry out numerical exercises in section 6. Section 7 concludes and points out possible future research. 
All the proofs of the propositions and expressions are given in the appendix.   
 
2. The Model 
In this section, we extend the equilibrium search model with wage-tenure contracts (Burdett and Coles 
2003) to two types of workers and firms.  
2.1 The Environment 
Consider an economy consisting of two types of workers and firms. The total population is    among 
which the majority workers (type  ) are        and the minority workers (type ) are   .  Among all 
the firms in the labor market, a fraction σ has a distaste for minority workers, denoted by ; and (1-σ) are 
non-discriminating firms denoted by  . Workers are assumed to be equally productive (productivity level 
    and have utility function     , where           . They are finitely lived, with a death rate  . To 
balance the population, it’s assumed that birth rate equals death rate and the newly born people enter the 
labor force immediately as unemployed. Unemployed workers can obtain an insurance compensation   
per instant. Workers--both employed and unemployed--search for better opportunity to maximize their 
expected lifetime utility. 
On the other hand, firms post the wage-tenure contracts and hire workers to maximize their profits. The 
wage-tenure contract is denoted by    , where   denotes tenure—the duration a worker has stayed in the 
firm. Suppose the offer arrival rate is the same for both employed and unemployed workers. Specifically, 
it is   for  ; for  , the offer arrival rate from   -firms is    while from   -firms is       , where 
        shows the degree of recruiting discrimination. 8  The larger   is, the more severe the 
discrimination.   -firms experience a disutility   from hiring   which enters the profit function directly. 
Therefore, the instantaneous profit from a   worker who has stayed in the  -firm for a duration   is: 
    
      .  
In addition, assume firms cannot fire workers but workers can quit for a better job without suffering any 
punishment from the previous employer. Furthermore, time preferences of workers and firms are assumed 
to be zero for the purpose of simplicity. It is also assumed no recalls in the process.  
2.2 Workers’ Optimal Decision 
                                                          
8
Differences in search intensity can also account for the differences in job arrival rates. But in this paper, since we 
assume that both types of workers exert the same level of effort in looking for jobs, the differences in job arrival 
rates reflect the degree of recruiting discrimination. Indeed, the existence of recruiting discrimination against blacks 
and women are widely documented, see, for example, Goldin and Rouse (2000), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) 
and Pager et al.(2009). 
5 
 
Let   ( |  
 ̃) be the expected lifetime utility of a type   (     ) worker who has tenure   under the 
wage-tenure contract  
 ̃
 and use an optimal quit strategy in the future, where  
 ̃
 denotes the wage-tenure 
contract a type   worker has signed with firm   (     ).       ,   
      and   
       are the offer 
distributions for   and   where superscripts  ,   denote non-discriminating and discriminating firms 
respectively. Here    is the starting expected lifetime value of the offer. Thus, the offer distribution 
measures the proportion of firms who provide workers an starting expected lifetime value no greater 
than   . Since all firms treat   the same, there is no difference in the offer distributions for   provided by 
  -or   -firms. Let   (  ̅̅ ̅  denote the infimum (supremum) of the support of    and    
 
 (  
 ̅̅ ̅) the infimum 
(supremum) of the support of   
 
 where      . 
First consider the situation of employed workers. The standard Bellman equations for employed type   
and type   workers are: 
   (     )       |  ̃   ∫ [       |  ̃ ]       
  ̅̅ ̅̅
    |  ̃ 
 
     |  ̃ 
  
                   (1a)                                    
   (     )     ( |  
 ̃)        ∫       *     ( |  
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 ̅̅ ̅̅̅
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 ̃
)
  
              ∫       *     ( |  
 ̃)+    
     
  
 ̅̅ ̅̅
  ( |  
 ̃
)
 
   ( |  
 ̃
)
  
                            (1b)                    
Note that   receives an offer at rate    whereas   has a probability of        receiving an offer from   
-firms and a probability of         receiving an offer from   -firms. The optimal quit strategy implies 
that they will quit and accept the new offer if and only if its starting value is greater than their current 
expected lifetime value.
9
 The last term in both equations calculates the instantaneous change in the 
expected lifetime value.  
Similarly, we can get the Bellman equations for unemployed workers of both types:  
             ∫ [      ]       
 ̅ 
   
                                               (2a)                                                
                  ∫ [      ]   
      
  
 ̅̅ ̅̅̅
   
        ∫ [      ]   
     
  
 ̅̅ ̅̅
   
      (2b)                
The offer provided by firms should be no less than the unemployed lifetime value   ; otherwise, no 
workers would be hired. Therefore,        and    
      where    ,  . 
2.3 Firms’ Optimal Decision 
                                                          
9
Since the relationship between the current expected lifetime value and the supremum of offers from  ( ) firm is 
not clear yet, the maximum between zero and instantaneous change if accepted the offer makes sure the non-
negativity and economic meaning. Intuitively, the current value should always be smaller than   
 ̅̅ ̅̅ , but may or may 
not be smaller than   
 ̅̅ ̅̅  which means the first    is trivial.      
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The optimization problem faced by firms is to choose two wage-tenure contracts, one for    and the other 
for  , to maximize the total expected profit at the steady state. To begin with, we need to derive the 
expressions of total expected profit for each firm. 
Since the quit rate of a type   worker who has stayed   periods under the wage-tenure contract      is 
      (    |  ̃ ), the survival probability of such a worker is: 
    |  ̃     , ∫ *   (    (    |  ̃ ))+
 
 
  -                                       (3a) 
Similarly, the survival probability of   is:  
  ( |  
 ̃)     { ∫ ,        *    
 (  ( |  
 ̃))+         *    
 (  ( |  
 ̃))+-
 
 
  } 
     (3b)   
Let       denote the steady state proportion of    who have an expected lifetime utility less than or equal 
to   (including the unemployed); and correspondingly,       for  . Thus, at the steady state, a firm 
posting an offer   can recruit  [            ] type-  and          (if -firm) or               
(if  -firm) type-  workers. The steady state profits of   and   firms are then functions of the wage-
tenure contracts: 
  (  
     
  )       
   (  
 )      ∫     |  ̃ [       ]
 
 
      (  
 )  ∫   ( |  
 ̃) [    
    ]
 
 
           (4a) 
  (  
     
  )    
   (  
 )      ∫     |  ̃ [       ]
 
 
           (  
 )  ∫   ( |  
 ̃)[    
      ]
 
 
      ( 4 b )                                                                                                                                                            
In each equation, the first part is the profit from   and the second part is the profit from  . The 
integration calculates the expected profit that each worker brings to the firm; the part before the 
integration measures the steady state number of workers hired at given offers. So, the multiplication 
reflects the firms’ expected profit from each type of workers. As both firms treat   equally, profit earned 
from   is the same between firms in equilibrium. 
To derive the optimal decisions of firms, we need to solve the profit maximization problems. Due to 
additivity, we can solve separately for  ;   in -firms and   in  -firms. Each sub-problem can be solved 
in two steps:  
(i) Conditional on the offer chosen, the optimal wage-tenure contract solves
10
: 
                                                          
10
It turns out to be an optimal control problem when the two control conditions are rewritten in the form of 
differential equations with starting values    ( |  
 ̃)    and   ( |  
 ̃)    
   . 
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∫   ( |  
 ̃) [    
    ]
 
 
   
s.t    ( |  
 ̃) satisfies (3) 
  ( |  
 ̃) satisfies (1) 
(ii) The optimal offer solves: 
         (  
  ) ∫   ( |  
 ̃) [    
    ]
 
 
    
s.t  
     solves (i)  
where      ;        
When it comes to type   workers in  -firms, the disutility taste   should be further subtracted from   
     .  
 
3 Equilibrium 
Since worker   faces homogenous firms in the labor market, the market equilibrium outcomes for this 
sub-problem are exactly the same as specified in Burdett and Coles (2003). To facilitate the discussion, 
we replicate the results in proposition 3.1:
11
 
Proposition 3.1 Given      and       is increasing and continuously differentiable, there exists a 
unique market equilibrium in type- ’s labor market. At the steady state equilibrium, the baseline salary 
scale satisfies: 
                                                    
    
    
 (
 
   
)
 
                                                                         (5) 
                                                    (  )       
√    
 
∫
       
√   
  
  
                                                    (6) 
The optimal wage-tenure contract follows the dynamic path: 
                                                   
   
  
 
       
      
∫
       
√           
  
  
                                                              (7) 
The earnings distribution is given by
12
: 
                                                          
11
Refer to Burdett and Coles (2003) for detailed proof; or, see the proof for Proposition 3.3 in the appendix for an 
outline. 
12
The earnings distribution is not described in Burdett and Coles (2003), but can be easily derived.  
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[√
    
   
  ]                                                                 (8) 
And the unemployment rate is:  
                                                      
 
   
                                                                               (9) 
Baseline salary scale is a succinct way to describe all the equilibrium solutions. For any starting expected 
lifetime value    from the support of offer distribution   , there exists a point    such that          ) 
where the subscript   denotes baseline. So the wage-tenure contract with a starting value    can be 
expressed as   |             ; that is, any equilibrium wage-tenure contract can be found on the 
baseline salary scale starting with a specific point   . In this paper, we suppress  -subscript for simplicity 
of representation. The optimal decision implied in the proposition is: a firm can set any wage between 
[       as the starting wage offer and backload it as described in the optimal wage-tenure dynamic (3); 
the total profit from   will be the same across firms no matter which wage-tenure contract they choose. 
Since 
   
  
 is positive, the optimal wage increases with tenure and the upper limit of the increment is   . 
Obviously, the wage support for type   workers can be solved by combining (5) and (6), from which the 
earnings distribution (8) can be derived. The unemployment rate is also given for the purpose of 
comparisons later.   
 Next, we solve the steady state equilibrium for  . To begin with, we show in proposition 3.2 that the 
optimal offer for   provided by  -firms is uniformly smaller than that provided by  -firms. Detailed 
Proofs of all the propositions in the paper are given in the appendix. 
Proposition 3.2: Let    
 denote the optimal offer for   given by  -firms and    
  the optimal offer 
provided by  -firms; then we have    
     
 . 
Proposition 3.2 simplifies the subsequent analysis substantially. As    
     
 , equations (1b) and (3b) 
can be rewritten for   in - and  - firms separately. Specifically, the Bellman equation for    workers 
working in  -firms is reduced to: 
   (  
    )     
 ( |  
 ̃)        ∫ *     
 ( |  
 ̃)+    
     
  
 ̅̅ ̅̅̅
  
 ( |  
 ̃)
 
   
 ( |  
 ̃)
  
     (10) 
For those working in  -firms the Bellman equation becomes: 
   (  
    )     
 ( |  
 ̃)        *   
    
 ( |  
 ̃)+ 
              ∫ *     
 ( |  
 ̃)+    
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 ( |  
 ̃)
  
                                                      (11)                                                                                                   
Similarly, survival probabilities of   workers who are employed by  -firms and  -firms change from 3(b) 
to: 
  ( |  
 ̃)     , ∫ [             
 (  ( |  
 ̃)) 
 
 
]  -                        ( 1 2 ) 
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  ( |  
 ̃)     , ∫ *                     
 (  ( |  
 ̃)) +   
 
 
-              ( 1 3 ) 
This makes disentanglement of the sub-problems for   workers in -and  -firm possible. The following 
proposition describes the equilibrium outcomes in the labor market for  . The crucial step in the proof is 
to define   
      and   
      to replace       . Let   
         [  
    
   be the proportion of   who 
have an expected lifetime value no greater than    in all type-  workers excluding those working in  -
firms and   
         [  
    
   be the proportion of type-  with expected lifetime value no greater 
than    in all type-  workers. Then, the proof of the equilibrium outcomes could fit nicely in that of 
Burdett and Coles (2003). Moreover, through constructing the overall        from    
      and   
     , 
we show that the lower bound of the starting wage in  -firms is the upper limit of starting wages offered 
by  -firms.  
Proposition 3.3: Given      and   
    ,   
     is increasing and continuously differentiable, there 
exists a unique market equilibrium in the labor market for type-  workers. At the steady state equilibrium, 
the baseline salary scale for worker   satisfies: 
                                           
    
   
     
   
 (
         
          
)
 
                                                                     (14) 
                                           (  
 )       
√    
   
 
∫
       
√     
  
 
  
                                                       (15)    
                                            
    
                                                                                   (16) 
                                           
    
 
    
   
 
         
                                                                       (17) 
The dynamics of baseline salaries are:  
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∫
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                                                (19) 
The earnings distribution is: 
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             [  
    
 ]
             (20) 
The unemployment rate is: 
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                                ( 2 1 ) 
This proposition shows that  -firms can set any starting wage between [  
    
   and then backload the 
wage using the rule described in (18). Profit from type-  workers is the same across the discriminating 
firms. Similarly,  -firms can determine any starting wage between [  
    
  , increase the wage with 
tenure as described in (19) and make the same profit as other -firms. One point to note is that although 
  
    
 ,   
    
 . Rather, employees hired in  -firms with a payment   
  have a higher expected 
lifetime value than the high-earners in  -firms, i.e.,   
    
 ; because workers with   
  can expect an 
immediate increase in the payment while those approaching   
  cannot.  
Second, from the expression of unemployment rate (21), we can see that disutility   has no effect on   ; 
and it is always higher than   ’s unemployment rate given in (9) if and only if there is discrimination in 
the labor market (    ). Note that if any of the two indicators equals to zero, there would be no 
discriminating firms existing in the labor market. 
Third, we can easily get the maximized total profit earned by a  -firm  
                                                     
    
 
          
    
   
[        ] 
                         (22) 
and  that by a  -firm:  
                                                               
    
 
    
    
 
 
                                                    (23)                                              
Substituting    
   in (23) with (17), and replacing   
  with  
 , the difference in profits in - and  - firm 
is:   
                                                           
 [ (    
 )       ]
[        ] 
                                                   (24)          
This is a general finding in the discrimination literature. We can see that, though  -firms extract a lot 
from a single  -worker by paying a lower wage, the total profit is less than that in  -firms; because the 
negative effect of smaller employment and higher quit rate in  -firm outweights the positive effect of a 
lower wage. Besides, the disutility taste  -firms have towards workers   widens the profit gap further. It 
is easy to see that, the larger       and   is, the larger the gap.13 This indicates that having more minority 
workers in the labor market places the discriminating firms in a worse situation; and, the more prejudiced 
the discriminating firms are, the higher the loss they will bear.
14
  
                                                          
13
Though values of   and   also influence   
  in the expression of profit difference, the negative correlation 
between     and   
  (which to be shown in section 4) will enhance the positive relationship between     and the 
profit gap. 
14
As the taste theory of employer discrimination (Becker, 1971) shows, the discriminating firms have to bear the 
cost of their distaste for the minority workers. Nevertheless, in a competitive environment the conclusion is often 
11 
 
In the next section, we focus on a more intriguing issue: comparisons of the steady state wages and the 
dynamics between both types of workers.  
4 Equilibrium Properties 
First, let’s consider the impact of 3 parameters associated with discrimination on   workers’ equilibrium 
wages. We can solve for the discriminating wage bounds from (14) and (15) and non-discriminating wage 
bounds from (16) and (17). Obviously, they are functions of productivity  , unemployment insurance  , 
birth-death rate   , normal offer arrival rate   and three discrimination indicators       ). The 
comparative statics yield: 
(1) 
   
 
  
     
   
 
  
      
(2) 
   
 
  
     
   
 
  
    
   
 
  
   
(3) 
   
 
  
      
   
 
  
   
Besides, we can prove: 
(4)    
   ; and  
    if   
 
 
      
Property (1) shows that the higher the proportion of  -firms in the market, the wider the range of 
discriminating wages will be. Moreover, the range extends in both directions. On the contrary, the degree 
of recruiting discrimination has an opposite effect; severe discrimination in the hiring process would lead 
to a narrowing of the discriminating wage range which converges to the unemployment insurance (which 
is implied by property (4)). The highest non-discriminating wage also decreases as the recruiting 
discrimination increases. Finally, the disutility of  -firms is negatively related to the upper bound of both 
the discriminating wages and non-discriminating wages for type   workers.  
It’s interesting to observe that the lowest acceptable wage is lower than the unemployment insurance. 
This result is unique within the search model with wage-tenure contract literature. In Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998) where firms set a constant wage rather than a wage-tenure contract, the lowest 
acceptable wage is the unemployment insurance   when the offer arrival rate is the same for both the 
employed and the unemployed. Under the wage-tenure framework, however, workers are willing to work 
at a wage lower than the unemployment insurance only because they can expect an immediate increase in 
the payment. In fact, the expected lifetime value at the lowest wage is virtually equal to that at the status 
of unemployment.  
Comparing the wage range of type   and                         :  
(5)       
      
     
                                                                                                                                                                                           
criticized, as it is not persisting in the long-run equilibrium. In this paper, the issue disappears due to implicit 
assumptions of the frictional labor market and exogenously given fraction of (non)discriminating firms in the model.   
12 
 
 ’s lowest acceptable starting wage is less than the lowest starting wage for   because first, worker  ’s 
wage increases with tenure more quickly than  ’s; second, compared to  ,   is more likely to get a new 
and better job offer in the labor market. The upper bound of  ’s wages being higher than that of their 
counterpart is within expectation. Discriminating firms are unlikely to set too high a wage due to their 
disutility tastes. 
Next, to see whether our model can predict the findings in empirical studies that female workers earn less 
than male workers on average (or the black earn less than the white) even though the productivity 
characteristics such as experience, education and training are controlled for, we derive the mean wages of 
both types of workers from (5), (8), (14), (16), (17) and (20), which gives:
15
  
    ∫     
    
  
  
       
           
 
 
        
  
    
                                                                                                      (25) 
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*
       
         
(    
   )  
     [         ]
 
     
  +      (26) 
Note that the unemployed workers are not included in the calculation.  
If only  -firms hire type   workers, then “minority workers receive lower wages than workers not facing 
discrimination” (Black, 1995) as long as there are discriminating firms in the labor market (   ).16 
Stated in property (6), that is: 
(6) If     and    , then        . 
However, this finding cannot be generalized. In the numerical example, we will show that if  -firms can 
hire   (     ), the average type   worker might be able to earn slightly higher wage than  . 
Discussions concerning the comparison of the average wages between   and   are deferred in section 6 
as it is almost impossible to get any conclusions without a particular utility function form or the 
parameters’ values.   
At last, we derive the wage quantiles of worker   and  : 
                                                          
15
See Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overview; Blau and Kahn (1996, 1997, 2000, 2003) for discussions on gender 
wage differentials across countries; and Smith (1993), Chandra (2000) and Antecol and Bedard (2004), among 
others for discussions on racial gender gap.   
16
In Black (1995), the wage of minority workers increases with their proportion. However, here the fraction of 
workers doesn’t enter any equilibrium outcomes. There are two reasons for this. First, in Black (1995) the number of 
discriminating firms decreases as the minority workers increase, while in this paper   is assumed to be exogenous. 
Second, the search friction varies in the two models. Unlike Black (1995) in which an exogenous cost is imposed on 
the search process, this paper presents a random search model where the friction is embodied in the finite job arrival 
rate. Thus wage dispersion resulted from random search makes comparisons more complicated than Black (1995)’s 
case. 
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Comparisons between the wage quantiles will be shown in a special case and numerical exercises later. 
We will see how the wage disparity changes along the wage distribution. Can our model predict glass 
ceilings or sticky floors commonly found in empirics, though we are aware that the skewness of the 
earnings distribution (equations (8) and (20)) do not fit the data well?
17
   
5. A special case 
In this section, a special case of the CRRA utility function:      
    
   
 (   ) is considered.18 
Tractable equilibrium solutions that are derived from proposition 3.1 and 3.3 and the special CRRA utility 
function can shed more light on the labor market with discrimination. Proposition 5 below summarizes 
the equilibrium results in this special case.  
Proposition 5: Given that both types of workers have the same CRRA utility function:      
    
   
 with 
   , the following statements hold: 
(1) The optimal strategy of firms is to set fixed wages instead of the wage-tenure contracts, i.e., 
   
 
  
  .  
(2) The wage bounds are:  
                      (
 
   
)
 
                         
  
                
    
      (
         
          
)
 
        
  
    (
 
         
)
 
  (
 
          
)
 
         
And the relationships among these bounds are     
      
    
    . 
(3)  ’s earnings distribution first order dominates  ’s earnings distribution, i.e.,   
    
  for all .  
                                                          
17
A growing literature studying the wage differential across distributions has emerged in recent decades. Glass 
ceilings, that the relative wage gap increases with quantile are commonly documented in developed countries like 
Sweden (Albrechet et al. 2003) and most European countries (Arulampalam et al. (2007)) while sticky floors that the 
relative wage gap reaches its maximum at the lower tail of the distribution are mainly found in Asian areas such as 
Singapore, the Philippines (Sakellariou (2004a; 2004b), Thailand (Fang and Sakellariou (2010), Vietnam (Pham and 
Reilly, 2007) and China (Chi and Li(2007)).   
18
Another two special cases, risk neutral and log utility functions are of interest as well since tractable solutions may 
be derived from partial differential equations with initial value conditions. We leave this as future work.    
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(4)         and the mean wage gap increases with       ). 
(5)  
    
 
 and the difference in wages at  th quantile decreases with  . 
As    , workers are infinitely risk averse; thus the optimal wage contract is constant wages, i.e.,  
   
 
  
  . The equilibrium search model with wage-tenure contracts then degenerates to Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998) and the discriminating wage-tenure equilibrium search model degenerates to a 
simplified version of Bowlus and Eckstein (2002).
19
 Figure 1 describes the earnings distributions for both 
types of workers and obviously  ’s cumulative earnings distribution first order dominates  ’s distribution. 
From first order dominance, properties (4) and (5) are directly obtained. In addition, the same reservation 
wages between   and   result from the assumption that the offer arrival rate is invariant between the 
employed and unemployed workers. The upper wage limit for   is less than  ’s because of the existence 
of the three non-zero discrimination parameters       ). 
Figure 1: Earnings distributions 
------------ type   worker                    --------- type   worker 
 
Moreover, the larger        ) is, the smaller  ’s average wage is. Since       ) does not enter type   
worker’s wage, the average wage gap increases as       ) increases. This conclusion is in line with the 
empirical findings. For example, Charles and Guryan (2008) plot the black-white wage gap against 
                                                          
19
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) extend Burdett and Mortensen (1998)’s model to discuss the contributions of 
discrimination and skill differences to the wage gaps. In their paper, the offer arrival rate is assumed to be different 
between the employed and the unemployed and therefore unlike what we get in this special case, the reservation 
wage is larger than the unemployment compensation    
15 
 
prejudicial attitude and find a wider gap at regions where many people will not vote for the black 
candidate for presidency or are against interracial marriages. 
In addition, (5) indicates a “sticky floor” effect since the (relative) wage gap is decreasing along the 
distribution under the assumption that both types of workers possess the same productivity. This special 
case seems to show that countries with high risk averse population are very likely to experience a sticky 
floor effect, a hypothesis definitely requiring more rigorous analysis and empirical evidence. We leave it 
as one possible direction for future research.    
 
6 Numerical Example 
As mentioned in section 4, it is interesting to examine the effect of the three discrimination-relevant 
parameters on the difference in the mean wages between type   and   workers. We assume in the section 
that all workers have the same CRRA utility function. The parameter values we choose are         
            and         .20  If the coefficients of relative risk aversion are             and    , 
equation (25) gives that  ’s average wages are 272.1134, 273.3307, 275.3025 and 276.8115 respectively. 
It seems that the more risk averse workers are, the higher the average wage they would earn.  
For worker  , we vary the values of       ) to see how the mean wage changes accordingly. Results are 
presented in table 1 in which the first panel fixes   and  , and changes the share of discriminating firms  ; 
the second panel changes the recruiting discrimination   and keeps the other two measures unchanged; 
the third one modifies disutility taste   given certain values of   and  . The findings are as follows. First, 
the mean wage of type   worker decreases in   and  , but increases in   while the relationship with   is 
uncertain. Second, the fraction of  -firms plays a key role in the average wage; the other three parameters, 
though matter to some extent, have only limited influence on the wage outcomes. Third, if only  -firms 
exist in the labor market (see the case     in Panel 1), the wage gap is very large; however, the gap will 
drop dramatically when  -firms begin to appear. In addition, Panel (2) indicates that the wage gap does 
not change much even when  -firms are forbidden to discriminate in hiring (see    ); on the other 
hand, what appears to be against expectation is that severe discrimination in recruitment leads to higher 
average wage for   and hence smaller wage gap (see      ). However, one should realize that this does 
not mean type   workers are better off because only a few will be hired in this situation and the overall 
welfare of type   workers is in fact jeopardized.   
Finally, compared to  ’s average wage, the numbers in Table 1 are almost consistently smaller, which 
accords with the common sense that discriminated workers have lower average wage. But, there are some 
exceptions. For example, when       and      ,  ’s average wage is 273.3993 in Panel 1, a little 
larger than  ’s mean wage 273.3307. This implies that when there is only mild discrimination against the 
minority workers, the discriminated group may earn more than the non-discriminated group. This is 
because convex earnings distribution indicates more workers distributed at high wages. If the number of 
 -firms is sufficiently large, only a few   receive lower discriminating wages and some   workers even 
                                                          
20
The values are borrowed from Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) where   is identified from the mean weekly earnings 
among black and white males who worked full-time between 1985 and 1988;   is the minimum weekly wage and   
and   are estimates of unemployment rate and death rate.   
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get wages higher than their counterparts. So the average values of  ’s wages can exceed  ’s average 
wage in rare cases. Indeed, similar results have appeared in the discrimination literature. Becker (1971) 
shows that in a competitive labor market, a wage differential occurs if and only if the fraction of 
discriminating firms is large enough. Aigner and Cain (1977) demonstrate in the case where the mean 
productivities are the same but variances are different that for less skilled workers the discriminated-
against workers have a higher average wage than their counterparts. In this paper, not only have we 
obtained this surprising result, but derived wage dispersions among equally productive workers which 
cannot be achieved in the first two types of discrimination in the  literature.  
Table 1: The mean wage of type   workers 
(1)              
                         
      272.1293 273.3993 274.2985 274.9699 
      266.8115 268.1293 269.0627 269.7598 
      257.9216 259.2913 260.2616 260.9865 
      239.8846 241.3105 242.3210 243.0759 
   .0 199.2173 200.7044 201.7586 202.5463 
 
(2)             
                         
   .0 263.3952 264.9373 265.9374 266.6517 
      263.3267 264.4216 265.2213 265.8328 
      263.9390 264.4312 264.8563 265.2231 
      265.6882 265.7274 265.7662 265.8044 
 
(3)              
                         
  10 267.9042 269.3757 270.4330 271.2300 
     263.6369 264.3334 264.9009 265.3683 
      259.8387 259.9760 260.1040 260.2230 
 
Next, we discuss the difference in wage dynamics between both types of workers. To be representative, 
we choose a most realistic case where                      and      and a special case in which 
 ’s mean wage exceeds that of type   worker (See figure 2).21 
  
                                                          
21
Given those values, the simulated average wages for   and   are 273.3307 and 227.6730 respectively, very close 
to 273.9 and 230.96 derived from real data (Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002). 
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Figure 2: Wage Dynamics 
(a) Severe discrimination  
 
(b) Mild discrimination 
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There are several points worth noting. First, the slope of the wage-tenure contract is positive, meaning 
that the wage will increase with tenure. Second, for type   workers, the increase accelerates at the 
beginning, and slows down gradually; on the other hand, for type   workers the increasing rate drops 
from the very beginning. Besides, it is found that the slope of  ’s wage-tenure contract is always larger 
than  ’s in  -firms. However, as to the slope of wage-tenure contracts designed for type   workers by  -
firms, it can be very close to type  ’s slope under mild discrimination, or even exceed that (figure b); 
while under severe discrimination where many firms have disutility taste towards type   workers and 
offer them less job opportunities,  -firms will not have an incentive to offer a sufficiently attractive 
contract for   and hence the increasing rate is much smaller than type  ’s slope (figure a).22 
Through the numerical example, we can clearly see and compare mean wages, wage dynamics and other 
aspects of interest.
23
 One surprising result highlighted in this paper is that given the same productivity, the 
discriminated group could earn more than the non-discriminated group on average if discrimination in the 
labor market is not severe.    
 
 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper we construct a discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts based on Burdett and 
Coles (2003) and succeed in predicting many stylized facts found in empirics using this model framework. 
For example, we show that discriminating firms earn less than non-discriminating firms, the 
unemployment rate is higher for minority workers than majority workers and earnings distributions for 
both types of workers vary. In addition, we show that for minority workers, the tenure-based wage in 
discriminating firms is invariably smaller than that in non-discriminating firms; and it increases much 
slower compared to the majority workers’ wage. Finally, the finding we would like to emphasize is that 
the mean wage gap is not positive under all circumstances. In very scarce cases of mild discrimination, 
equally productive and discriminated workers may get a higher average wage. Some other implications of 
discrimination on the labor market outcomes are discussed as well. 
In future research, the assumption of same productivity among workers can be relaxed. It will not affect 
the form of equilibrium results, however the discussion on the comparisons of wage-tenure contracts will 
become considerably complicated as analytical solutions may be impossible. Nevertheless, one may 
empirically identify and estimate parameters in the structural model and hence would be able to get the 
contributions of productivity differences vs. discrimination in the wage differentials between workers. 
Wage data by tenure could be used in such future research. In addition, one can incorporate the free entry 
condition to endogenize the equilibrium firm numbers in the labor market. Under this assumption, total 
profit should decline to zero; but an additional assumption on the fraction of potential discriminating 
firms will have to be added.   
                                                          
22
The slopes of the wage-tenure contracts are compared at the same wage level.  
23
Wage differentials across quantiles could also be obtained in the numerical example, but not discussed here due to 
its failure to be representative.  
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Appendix 
Proof of proposition 3.2 
Proof: 
Since    
  and    
  are offers chosen by  -and  -firms to maximize their respective profit flow at 
the steady state, it implies 
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Note that  
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 (     ) is the wage-tenure contract designed to deliver the offer, so it’s a function of 
   
 . The two inequalities then imply: 
   (   
 )  ∫   ( |  
 ̃) [    
    ]
 
 
     (   
 )  ∫   ( |  
 ̃) [    
      ]
 
 
    
      (   
 )  ∫   ( |  
 ̃) [    
    ]
 
 
     (   
 )  ∫   ( |  
 ̃) [    
      ]
 
 
     
If we define:  
 (  
 )     (  
 ) ∫     |  ̃ 
 
 
    
Then the above inequality is: 
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due to the increasing property of   (  
 ) and     |  ̃  with respect to   
 , we have    
     
 . 
 
Proof of proposition 3.3 
Proof: 
(1) First consider the optimal wage-tenure contract designed for  -workers by discriminating firms.  
Given the starting offer   , the wage-tenure function solves: 
         ∫   ( |  
 ̃) [    
      ]
 
 
    
where                ̇   [                     
    
   ]                       (A1) 
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with starting values                                                 
         
To solve the dynamic optimization problem, define the Hamiltonian: 
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Where       are costate variables with respect to    and   
    
The necessary conditions are: 
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And the two differential equations    and   
  should satisfy (A1), (A2). 
Integrate (A4) with the integrating factor    yields: 
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Define the expected future profit flow from tenure period   onwards as: 
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Then, 
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Since it’s an autonomous control problem, the optimized Hamiltonian is zero, i.e.,    . 
Substituting       in  out yields: 
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Therefore,    has to be zero to make   
  bounded. Thus       
 ( |  
 ̃) and (A4) turns to be                     
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   ]       (A6) 
And (A2), (A6) and     give: 
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 Integrate (A5) with the integrating factor 
 
  
  and substitute    with   
  yields: 
  
  
  ∫   
          
     
    
 
 
     
 To Substitute    in (A3) using the above expression and differentiate with respect to  , we get: 
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In addition, the transversality condition implies         
 ( |  
 ̃)    
 . 
 
(2) Next, we present the equilibrium results in terms of baseline wage.  
If the solution to the above optimization problem with      
  is taken as the baseline, then for any 
starting offer    [  
    
   , there exists    such that   
         . So, the optimal wage contract 
of any firm and all the equilibrium solutions could be expressed in terms of the baseline. For example, 
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        .  Then, it’s 
easy to derive  
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 . Further, from (A2) we can obtain   
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and from (A6), we get    
  
    
   
        
. 
Let    denote the unemployment rate,    denote the share of   workers employed in  -firms and    
the share employed in -firms. The flow conditions imply  
                      ;    
                      ; 
                 
So, the unemployment rate is: 
   
 
          
  
And the employment rate of type   workers in  -firms and  -firms are:  
   
        
[          ][         ]
;           
      
         
 
Let   
         [  
    
   be the proportion of   workers who have an expected lifetime value no 
greater than    in all the   workers excluding those working in  -firms. Then   
      is the 
corresponding baseline expression which satisfies: 
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and the flow condition for   workers employed in   firms with salary point greater than  : 
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As every  -firm makes the same profit from  -workers at the equilibrium, and   
    ,   
     
 , 
from the profit function: 
  
          
               
      
we can get:  
  
       
      
    
   
        
. 
So, 
   
  
  
  
   
   
  
  
  
      
Then substituting out 
   
  
  
and 
   
  
  
 using (A6) and (A10) and combining it with (A10) yields:  
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Putting the expression of    
   into (A9) thus gets equation (10) in the proposition, i.e., 
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The offer distribution could be derived from (A6), (A7), (A8) and the expression of   
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Further,   
          at the equilibrium.  
Since, 
   
     
  
          
   
which is derived from the baseline expression of (A2) at   
    
      and the Bellman equation for 
unemployed   workers; and,  
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which could be derived from substitutions using (A6), (A7), (A11) and the expression of   
  ; we can 
derive another relationship between the bounds of the support of discriminating wages, i.e., equation 
(11): 
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Besides, the dynamics of baseline tenure-wages (equation (14)) could be easily derived from (A8), 
(A11) and   
   expression.  
 
 (3) By the same token, we can get the equilibrium outcomes for   workers in the non-discriminating 
firms. Following the same procedures, we can prove that (15) holds. However, the support of the non-
discriminating wages is somewhat different in the derivation.  
Let   
         *  
    
 ) be the proportion of   workers (including the unemployed) who have an 
expected lifetime value no greater than   . Then, for the baseline expression, we have   
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So, the overall proportion of type   workers (including the unemployed) who earn less than or equal 
to  at the steady state is:   
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 . Further, as: 
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Thus, (12) (13) are proved. 
 
(4) Finally, we derive the earnings distribution of type   workers. 
Given   
   and   
  , the earning distributions of   workers in the  -and  - firms at the steady state 
are:  
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]  
And:  
  
   
 
  
[  
             ] 
So, the overall earning distribution is: 
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Substituting the expressions of   
  ,   
  ,       and    inside, gives equation (16).       
 
Proof of Equations (20), (21) 
Proof 
As shown above:  
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Proof of properties (1)-(6) in section 4 
Proof 
First, let’s consider properties (1)-(3). 
From equation (11), taking partial derivatives with respect to       ) yields:  
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Similarly, partial differentiation of equation (10)gives: 
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Substituting them into the first group of equations, results in: 
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So, 
   
 
  
 and 
   
 
  
 have the same sign as 
   
 
  
 and 
   
 
  
. But the sign of 
   
 
  
 is uncertain. 
Next, prove property (4). 
From (11) we get   (  
 )      . Thus,  
    because of the increasing property of     .   
In  proving the other side by contradiction, let’s assume:   
   , then the integrated variable 
satisfies  
      
   . So we have: 
∫
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 √     
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If   
 
 
     , then   
           . Thus, 
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 √     
   and ∫
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which violates equation (11). Therefore, the assumption is false and we have proved   
    if 
  
 
 
     . 
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As for property (6), if    , equation (24) is reduced to  
        
  
 
      
   
    
   
  
         
     
   
where  
  and  
  satisfy:   
 (  
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∫
       
√   
  
 
  
   
 and: 
    
 
    
   
 
         
  . 
The only difference in the system of equations compared with those for type   workers is the offer 
arrival rate, i.e.,     for type   while     for type  . 
Let   
 
         
, after some algebra the mean wage could be rewritten as: 
                    
From the system of equations about        , we can get: 
  
  
 
           
  
      
 
 
where,  
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>0. 
So,  
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where the last inequality holds due to:  
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In addition, as   is increasing in  , we  get 
   
  
  . So the proposition is proved.  
 
Proof of proposition 5 
Proof 
(1) and (2) can be directly derived from proposition 3.1 and proposition 3.3.   
     because  
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] (
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 Next, consider the comparison of earning distributions.  
Since  
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and  
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we can get   
    
  for all .  
Putting the wage expressions into (23) and (24), we get:   
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 Where, 
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Therefore,         
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          .  
Through tedious calibration, we can get the comparative statics of        : 
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>0. 
Define      
    
 
. From (25) and (26), we have 
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Taking partial derivative with respect to   yields 
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So, property (5) is proved. 
 
 
